US Adults' Beliefs About Harassing or Threatening Public Health Officials During the COVID-19 Pandemic.

Importance: The rise in attacks on public health officials has weakened the public health workforce and complicated COVID-19 mitigation efforts. Objective: To examine the share of US adults who believed harassing or threatening public health officials because of COVID-19 business closures was justified and the factors shaping those beliefs. Design, Setting, and Participants: The Johns Hopkins University COVID-19 Civic Life and Public Health Survey was fielded from November 11 to 30, 2020, and July 26 to August 29, 2021. A nationally representative cohort of 1086 US adults was included. Main Outcomes and Measures: Respondents were asked how much they believed that threatening or harassing public health officials for business closures to slow COVID-19 transmission was justified. Adjusted differences in beliefs regarding attacks on public health officials were examined by respondent sociodemographic and political characteristics and by trust in science. Results: Of 1086 respondents who completed both survey waves, 565 (52%) were women, and the mean (SE) age was 49 (0.77) years. Overall, 177 respondents (16%) were Hispanic, 125 (11%) were non-Hispanic Black, 695 (64%) were non-Hispanic White, and 90 (8%) were non-Hispanic and another race. From November 2020 to July and August 2021, the share of adults who believed harassing or threatening public health officials because of business closures was justified rose from 20% (n = 218) to 25% (n = 276) (P = .046) and 15% (n = 163) to 21% (n = 232) (P = .01), respectively. In multivariable regression analysis, respondents who trusted science not much or not at all were more likely to view threatening public health officials as justified compared with who trusted science a lot (November 2020: 35% [95% CI, 21%-49%] vs 7% [95% CI, 4%-9%]; P < .001; July and August 2021: 47% [95% CI, 33%-61%] vs 15% [95% CI, 11%-19%]; P < .001). There were increases in negative views toward public health officials between November 2020 and July and August 2021, among those earning $75 000 or more annually (threatening justified: 7 [95% CI, 1-14] percentage points; P = .03), those with some college education (threatening justified: 6 [95% CI, 2-11] percentage points; P = .003), those identifying as politically independent (harassing justified: 9 [95% CI, 3-14] percentage points; P = .01), and those trusting science a lot (threatening justified: 8 [95% CI, 4-13] percentage points; P < .001). Conclusions and Relevance: While antagonism toward public health officials was concentrated among those doubting science and groups most negatively affected by the pandemic (eg, those with lower income and less education), the findings of this study suggest that there has been a shift toward such beliefs within more economically advantaged subgroups and those more trusting of science. Restoring public trust in public health officials will require nuanced engagement with diverse groups.

The influence of civic associations and exposure to ideological heterogeneity on public views on mask wearing and social distancing.

Mask wearing and social distancing have been essential public health guidelines throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, but faced resistance from skeptical subgroups in the United States, including Republicans and evangelicals. We examined the effects of participation in ideologically heterogeneous civic associations on attitudes toward public health measures during the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly among partisan and religious subgroups most resistant to public health guidelines. We analyzed panel survey data from a nationally representative cohort of 1222 U.S. adults collected in April, July, and November 2020, and July/August 2021. Data on the importance of social distancing and mask wearing were collected in November 2020. Evangelicals and Republicans who participated in ideologically diverse civic associations were more likely to support mask wearing compared to those participating in ideologically homogenous associations (difference in predicted policy support on a 0-1 scale: 0.084, p ≤ .05 and 0.020, p ≤ .05, respectively). Evangelicals in ideologically diverse associations were also more likely to support social distancing compared to those in ideologically homogenous associations (0.089, p ≤ .05). Participation in civic associations with ideologically heterogeneous members was associated with greater support for public health measures among skeptical subgroups. Encouraging exposure to diverse ideologies may bolster support for public health measures to mitigate COVID-19.

Civic engagement and psychological distress during the COVID-19 pandemic.

BACKGROUND: To examine the relationship between civic association participation and psychological distress during the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly whether different forms of engagement mitigate the increased rates of psychological distress throughout 2020. METHODS: Panel survey data collected from a nationally representative cohort of 1222 U.S. adults. Data was collected in three waves in April, July, and November 2020. Psychological distress was measured using the validated Kessler-6 instrument in November 2020. RESULTS: Respondents belonging to political associations were more likely to experience psychological distress (difference in predicted level of psychological distress on a 0-1 scale: 0.098, p ≤ .05) relative to those in unknown associations. However, individuals in political associations who more frequently interacted with others had lower levels of psychological distress (-.065, p ≤ .05) compared to those in political associations with less frequent interactions. CONCLUSIONS: Civic engagement that facilitates interpersonal interactions may protect against psychological distress.

Predictors of Public Support for Social Safety Net Policy During the COVID-19 Pandemic.

INTRODUCTION: U.S. residents had varying experiences of the COVID-19 pandemic and social safety net policy in 2020. Past research has suggested that partisanship, ideology, racial attitudes, and personal experience may each influence policy attitudes. In this study, we explore whether variation in support for social safety net policy in 2020 is predicted by negative experiences of the pandemic when controlling for racial attitudes, partisanship, and ideology. METHODS: Support for 12 social safety net policies in 2020 was estimated using data from a nationally representative panel survey of U.S. adults conducted in 2020 (n=1,222). Logistic regression was used to examine differences in the predicted probability of supporting a majority of social safety net policies related to health, housing, and employment by partisanship, ideology, racial attitudes, and negative experiences of the pandemic. Analyses were conducted in 2021. RESULTS: Higher levels of symbolic racism was a consistently strong predictor of lower social safety net policy support across health, housing, and employment policies; as was identifying as either Conservative or Republican. Negative experiences of the pandemic were generally unpredictive of support for the social safety net policy. CONCLUSIONS: Despite the pandemic's consequences as well as the potential for social safety net policy to address these consequences, negative experiences of the pandemic failed to predict policy support, even as racial attitudes, partisanship, and ideology strongly predicted these preferences in 2020. Building public support for social safety net policy requires communication strategies that identify the shared benefits of these policies.

Public support for U.S. social safety net policies throughout the COVID-19 pandemic.

COVID-19 has stretched the U.S. social safety net and prompted federal legislation designed to ameliorate the pandemic's health and economic impacts. We surveyed a nationally representative cohort of 1222 U.S. adults in April 2020 and November 2020 to evaluate changes in public opinion about 11 social safety net policies and the role of government over the course of the pandemic. A majority of U.S. adults supported six policies at both time points, including policies guaranteeing two weeks of paid sick leave; enacting universal health insurance; increasing the federal minimum wage; and increasing government spending on construction projects, business tax credits, and employment education and training. From April to November 2020, public support was stable for nine of the 11 policies but declined nearly 10 percentage points for policies guaranteeing two weeks paid sick leave (from 76% support in April 2020 to 67% support in November 2020) and extending unemployment insurance benefits (51% to 42%). Declines in support for these two policies were concentrated among those with higher incomes, more education, in better health status, the employed, and those with health insurance. The share of respondents believing in a strong role of government also declined from 33% in April to 26% in November 2020 (p > 0.05). Despite these shifts, we observed consistent majority support for several policies enacted during the pandemic, including guaranteeing paid sick leave and business tax credits, as well as employment-related policies.